Dreams that Matter

“The government used to steal our money,” Ahmad says with a sad smile on his face. “But today things are even worse. Today they steal our hope, too.” It is May 2007, and Ahmad and I are sitting in a street café on an alley in downtown Cairo where plastic bags and dust are swirling through the air. On the wall behind me a cockroach is crawling, and I try unobtrusively to move my chair a little farther away from it. All around us young and middle-aged men are smoking shisha, some of them chatting but most sitting in silence. A veiled woman dressed in black is performing as a fire-eater in the middle of the alley, but no one seems to be paying attention to her. Ahmad suggests that one of these days I should count the number of people entering stores in downtown Cairo who leave with a shopping bag in their hands. It won’t be many, he predicts. People can’t afford to buy anymore; the only thing left is window-shopping. We are sipping heavy tea that is bearable only with an excessive amount of sugar. But the tea is not the only thing that is heavy; so is the atmosphere. Like Ahmad, many friends during the course of my visit will explain that economically, morally, and politically, Egypt is going through a crisis. Almost everyone I talk to feels helpless, hopeless, and outraged about the ongoing war in Iraq and about the emergency laws that interdict all expressions of discontent within Egypt itself.  “We’re living a nightmare,” people say when I bring up the topic of dreams.

-Amira Mittermaier, Dreams that Matter, pg. 1

Repost: Failed states are a western myth

Brilliant article by Elliot Ross. Original article can be found here.

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In the same week that the investigative reporter Jeremy Scahill spoke of the need for the US to "take a humility pill", we've been subjected to precisely the opposite – yet another instalment of Foreign Policy magazine's annual Failed States Index, complete with accompanying "postcards from hell" purporting to show what it's like "living on the edge in the world's worst places".

Quibbling with the many bizarre claims of the index is tempting (Kenya is "less stable" than Syria, we learn), but in the end such gripes only give credibility to this tedious yearly exercise in faux-empirical cultural bigotry. For anyone interested in actually finding out about places such as Yemen or Uganda, the index is probably the last place you'd want to go. But what's more interesting, and more helpful in understanding what the index really does, is to grasp that the very concept of the "failed state" comes with its own story.

The organisation that produces the index, the Fund for Peace, is the kind of outfit John le Carré thinks we should all be having nightmares about. Its director, JJ Messner (who puts together the list), is a former lobbyist for the private military industry. None of the raw data behind the index is made public. So why on earth would an organisation like this want to keep the idea of the failed state prominent in public discourse?

The main reason is that the concept of the failed state has never existed outside a programme for western intervention. It has always been a way of constructing a rationale for imposing US interests on less powerful nations.

Luckily, we can pinpoint exactly where it all began – right down to the words on the page. The failed state was invented in late 1992 by Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner, two US state department employees, in an article in – you guessed it – Foreign Policy, suggestively entitled Saving failed states. With the end of the cold war, they argued, "a disturbing new phenomenon is emerging: the failed nation state, utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community". And with that, the beast was born.

What followed in the essay was a grumpy version of the history of the "third world" after 1945, in which Helman and Ratner lamented that the claims of "self-determination" made by colonised peoples had ever been established as a major principle for organising international affairs. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, Helman and Ratner argued, the time for fripperies such as state sovereignty for third world nations was over. What these failed states needed was the ever-benign "guardianship" of the western world. We westerners would keep hold of our sovereignty, of course; they would make do with something called "survivability" instead, and be grateful for it.

Iran’s Predictable Elections [Re-post]

This is a re-posting of an article written by Hossein Hafezian, an esteemed academic in Iran and expert on the Middle East. The article is a brief overview of the implications of the election of Hassan Rouhani and the political atmosphere of modern Iran. The original article can be found here.

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Although Hassan Rouhani’s victory in the first round of the Iranian presidential elections appeared to be surprising to many observers — particularly those outside Iran — the fact is that in the past 16 years since 1997, the reformist and moderate elements have won every national election in which they have been given a fair chance. This election was no exception. Rouhani became the front-runner the day the reformist candidate, Mohammad Reza Aref, exited the contest to support Rouhani’s campaign. After that, it became a matter of whether Rouhani would win the election in the first or in the runoff round. For this favor to Rouhani and the entire reformist-centrist camp, Aref might be appointed first vice president, a position he held previously, under the second government of Mohammad Khatami.

What can Rouhani do?

Those who assert that the president cannot make a difference in Iranian domestic politics or foreign policy most likely did not live in Iran during the Khatami and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad presidencies. Thus, they have no true basis for comparing these periods. Even ordinary Iranians can tell how politics, economy and culture were totally different under these two men, who served under the same Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Certainly, a president is not in a position to change everything in Iran’s complicated political system, but he wields enough leverage to put his seal on Iranian politics and the economy, as presidents of the past couple of decades have done.

Rouhani, backed by the popular legitimacy he garnered with his undisputed victory, can now launch plans to return Iran to the path of economic development, political liberalization and rapprochement with the outside world after being derailed for eight years. The majority of the political elite has reached the conclusion that the country has been poorly run, particularly during the past four years, and has suffered from unnecessary tensions with the international community. Removing these tensions with Western powers and regional players is the key to addressing the economic hardship felt by all Iranians in their daily lives, notably during the last few years of international sanctions.

The consensus among the power centers in Iran was best illustrated by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ statement in which it promised Rouhani that it would fully cooperate with him. At the same time, Majlis speaker Ali Larijani visited Rouhani’s office to congratulate him and to promise his full cooperation in selecting his cabinet. These gestures serve to indicate that Rouhani will not be on a collision course with the other power brokers in Iran. All the circles of power apparently want to rid the country of its foreign policy troubles and craft a resolution to the nuclear standoff. Rouhani is likely to find a mutually acceptable solution to the nuclear issue in a few months, leading to the lifting of sanctions one by one.

In the Shining Sun of the Holy Prophet

On this blessed eid of Mab'ath (the day that Muhammad became appointed as the Holy Prophet of Allah), I'd like to share a wonderful poem by Saadi describing the absolute beauty and dignity of this mercy to the worlds, our master and leader, Rasullulah Muhammad. I will roughly translate the last two lines in his honor.

Until sleep, my eyes saw the beauty of Muhammad / [Alas] they will not sleep from the thought of Muhammad

Saadi, if you [want to] enact love and youth / The love of Muhammad and his family is enough.

ماه فروماند از جمال محمد

سرو نباشد به اعتدال محمد

قدر فلک را کمال و منزلتی نیست

در نظر قدر با کمال محمد

وعدهٔ دیدار هر کسی به قیامت

لیلهٔ اسری شب وصال محمد

آدم و نوح و خلیل و موسی و عیسی

آمده مجموع در ظلال محمد

عرصهٔ گیتی مجال همت او نیست

روز قیامت نگر مجال محمد

وآنهمه پیرایه بسته جنت فردوس

بو که قبولش کند بلال محمد

همچو زمین خواهد آسمان که بیفتد

تا بدهد بوسه بر نعال محمد

شمس و قمر در زمین حشر نتباد

نور نتابد مگر جمال محمد

شاید اگر آفتاب و ماه نتابند

پیش دو ابروی چون هلال محمد

چشم مرا تا به خواب دید جمالش

خواب نمی‌گیرد از خیال محمد

سعدی اگر عاشقی کنی و جوانی

عشق محمد بس است و آل محمد

VICE: Congressman Jim McDermott on Depleted Uranium Usage in US Military

When Kingship came down from Heaven: Ethics and the political

A very thought provoking lecture by the brilliant Dr. Sayyid. He is one of my favorite public intellectuals and has shaped my thought in many ways, especially through his book, A Fundamental Fear.

Sayyid discusses the relationship between ethics, morality, and power. He makes some fascinating arguments which I will try to briefly summarize below. Although I recommend listening to the entire lecture because it is really beneficial.

First, rationality and power are intimately intertwined in society. In short, every decision can be rationalized, but it is those in power who have the authority and legitimacy to first act, and second define their actions as rational. They are not always successful in this endeavor, mind you, but this is prevalent in the mundane acts of life -- it is only in extraordinary moments that this tends to get successfully challenged.

The second, and last point I wish to mention from the lecture is: the life we live is in the difference between what we should be and what we are. This is where ethics and morality comes in. Morality, it seems from the lecture, is how we should act, while ethics is the process of rectifying reality with normative states.

This is why kingship and ethics have always been intertwined historically speaking. It was and is recognized that our actions fall short of our ideals. Kings and rulers should be the representatives of God on earth, since God is the ultimate justice and truth.

This difference that Dr. Sayyid mentions, though, is what gives our life meaning. The constant striving to make our lives better is one of the things which differentiate us from beings which just respond to stimuli and go about life.

Re-posting: Tehran Tanking

Very insightful analysis on this relevant issue!

Tehran Tanking - By Marc Lynch | Foreign Policy

Iran is now viewed unfavorably in a majority of Arab countries, according to a major new survey conducted by James Zogby of 20 Arab and Muslim-majority countries. Iran's appeal to mainstream Arab public opinion has virtually collapsed from its 2006 peak, he found, in part because of its violent suppression of protests following the 2009 presidential election. "Syria is the nail in the coffin of Iran's favorable rating in the region," Zogby concluded.

But concealed within a positive narrative of collapsing Iranian soft power is powerful evidence of the alarming spread, intensification, and consolidation of an extremely dangerous sectarianism. That sectarianism, spurred by the repression in Bahrain and the catastrophe in Syria and fueled by Gulf media, is likely more crucial to the future of the Middle East than the ups and downs in Iranian -- or American -- favorable ratings.

It's nothing new to say that sectarianism has spiked over the last two years, after being largely absent in the early heady days of the Arab uprisings. Zogby's wide-ranging survey offers some fascinating new evidence, however. Public opinion survey research in the Arab worldalways needs to be treated with caution -- sampling is difficult in countries experiencing internal conflict or without accurate census data, while pervasive secret police make honesty a dubious proposition -- but it has become far more routinized and professionalized over the last decade. Some of the numbers in this Zogby poll seem a bit questionable: the 84 percent of Lebanese reporting a favorable view of Iran seems difficult to credit, while the results in Libya (80 percent favorable) and Yemen (84 percent favorable) may be shaped by the difficult of doing survey research in near-failed state conditions. But the broader portrait of Arab rejection of Iran and growing sectarianism is consistent with trends in the media, developments on the ground, and the symbolism of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad getting socked with a shoe in Cairo.

The major message in the presentation and reporting of the survey has been the narrative of Iranian decline, articulated bluntly by the title of the Wilson Center event where it was launched:The Rise and Fall of Iran in Arab and Muslim Eyes. The results of the survey do indeed support that narrative: Only two Arab countries now see Iran as a good model (Lebanon and Iraq), Iran is viewed unfavorably in 11 out of 17 Arab countries, and large majorities of Arab publics sided with the opposition Green Movement over the Iranian government and disapprove of Iran's role in Syria, Iraq, and the Gulf. These findings should put an end to the conceit that Iran is on the march or that Arabs have the slightest interest in aligning with Tehran with or without a nuclear bomb.

This should not be taken as a green light for military action against Tehran, though. While support for a military strike with international legitimacy has grown significantly since 2006 in the polling, there isn't a majority in favor in any Arab country. A 34-point increase in support for a military strike among Jordanians or a 24-point increase among Egyptians is significant as a trend. But approval of military action doesn't crack 40 percent in any surveyed country, which is hardly an overwhelming mandate. Indeed, an American or Israeli military strike is probably the only thing that could rescue Iran's regional image at this point -- particularly if the regime is able to emerge with a Hezbollah-like narrative of success through survival.

Iran's favorability will ebb and flow with political events. But the spreading and entrenched sectarianism revealed in the survey will have far more enduring and profoundly negative implications for the region. And the magnitude of the sectarian divide in the poll's findings is certainly eye-opening. In Saudi Arabia, 92 percent of Shia reported a favorable view of Iran compared with 0 percent of Sunnis; in Bahrain, 76 percent approved of Iran compared with 4 percent of Sunnis. The same phenomenon appeared in almost every country with a significant Shia population: 82 percent of Shia and 15 percent of Sunni in Iraq, 63 percent to 32 percent in Kuwait, 67 percent to 21 percent in the United Arab Emirates. The same trend could be seen across almost every question asked: Very few Sunnis anywhere, for instance, considered Iran a positive model for development, but 79 percent of Kuwaiti Shia did, along with 72 percent of Bahraini Shia and 89 percent of Iraq Shia.

Syria, which Zogby sees as the nail in the coffin for Iran, demonstrates the importance of this divide. Overall, few Arab populations thought Iran was playing a positive role in Syria: Thirteen percent of Jordanians, 17 percent of Palestinians and Moroccans, 12 percent of Egyptians, 9 percent of Saudis, 39 percent of Bahrainis. Only Lebanon (72 percent -- again, difficult to believe) and Iraq (54 percent) reported favorable views of Iran's role. But again, the sectarian breakdown shows that these views are increasingly shaped by identity: 57 percent of Saudi Shia thought Iran was playing a positive role in the Syria conflict (as opposed to 0 percent of Sunnis), as did 57 percent of Kuwaiti Shia, 73 percent of Bahraini Shia, 76 percent of Iraqi Shia, and 87 percent of Shia in the UAE. What initially looks like a unified Arab public stance toward Syria, and toward Iran more generally, turns into one of stark and intense polarization.

As an aside, the responses on the Iranian government's repression of the Green Movement in 2009 were fascinating. With three years' perspective, almost all Arab publics now sided with the Iranian democracy movement: 70 percent in Kuwait, 73 percent in Qatar, 65 percent in Egypt, 62 percent in Tunisia, 62 percent of Saudis. But the Shia divided in interesting ways: 87 percent of Kuwaiti Shia and 62 percent of Saudi Shia supported the Green Movement, but 69 percent of Bahraini Shia and 73 percent of Iraqi Shia sided with the Iranian government.

Arabs are worried about this growing sectarian divide. At least two thirds of respondents said they were concerned about the spread of sectarianism in almost every country surveyed. In many countries the concern was far wider: 100 percent of Lebanese, 97 percent of Iraqis, 87 percent of Jordanians, 89 percent of Palestinians, 85 percent of Yemenis, 82 percent of Saudis, 91 percent of Libyans, 83 percent of Egyptians, 75 percent of Kuwaitis, 74 percent of Bahrainis, 78 percent of Qataris. For many, this alarm over of sectarianism likely reflects a perception of rising Shia power in the region, but the evolving identity politics penetrate far more deeply into local politics as well as regional affairs.

Iran is not the principal driver of this sectarianism, however. Its rising power in the middle of the decade perhaps sparked Sunni fears, but its own rhetoric tends to focus on a generic "resistance" identity and on an "Islamic Awakening" rather than on Shiism's particulars. Its power grew with the American-led overthrow of its major strategic rivals in Afghanistan and Iraq. The peak of influence in the region probably came in 2006, when Hezbollah flags festooned the streets of (very Sunni) Cairo following its perceived military victory over Israel. From Tehran's perspective, even where it enjoys support from Shia communities, the less that Shiism is discussed and the more that Arabs focus on "resistance," the better. An Israeli or American attack on Iran or an Israeli war with Hezbollah or Hamas tends to highlight that narrative and thus helps Iran's image. Less often remarked is how that "resistance" narrative might unfold over the next few years following the fall of the Assad regime, where Iran might seek new support by sponsoring resistance to a Western and Gulf Arab-backed new regime in Damascus.