Repost: Failed states are a western myth

Brilliant article by Elliot Ross. Original article can be found here.

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In the same week that the investigative reporter Jeremy Scahill spoke of the need for the US to "take a humility pill", we've been subjected to precisely the opposite – yet another instalment of Foreign Policy magazine's annual Failed States Index, complete with accompanying "postcards from hell" purporting to show what it's like "living on the edge in the world's worst places".

Quibbling with the many bizarre claims of the index is tempting (Kenya is "less stable" than Syria, we learn), but in the end such gripes only give credibility to this tedious yearly exercise in faux-empirical cultural bigotry. For anyone interested in actually finding out about places such as Yemen or Uganda, the index is probably the last place you'd want to go. But what's more interesting, and more helpful in understanding what the index really does, is to grasp that the very concept of the "failed state" comes with its own story.

The organisation that produces the index, the Fund for Peace, is the kind of outfit John le Carré thinks we should all be having nightmares about. Its director, JJ Messner (who puts together the list), is a former lobbyist for the private military industry. None of the raw data behind the index is made public. So why on earth would an organisation like this want to keep the idea of the failed state prominent in public discourse?

The main reason is that the concept of the failed state has never existed outside a programme for western intervention. It has always been a way of constructing a rationale for imposing US interests on less powerful nations.

Luckily, we can pinpoint exactly where it all began – right down to the words on the page. The failed state was invented in late 1992 by Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner, two US state department employees, in an article in – you guessed it – Foreign Policy, suggestively entitled Saving failed states. With the end of the cold war, they argued, "a disturbing new phenomenon is emerging: the failed nation state, utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community". And with that, the beast was born.

What followed in the essay was a grumpy version of the history of the "third world" after 1945, in which Helman and Ratner lamented that the claims of "self-determination" made by colonised peoples had ever been established as a major principle for organising international affairs. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, Helman and Ratner argued, the time for fripperies such as state sovereignty for third world nations was over. What these failed states needed was the ever-benign "guardianship" of the western world. We westerners would keep hold of our sovereignty, of course; they would make do with something called "survivability" instead, and be grateful for it.

Iran’s Predictable Elections [Re-post]

This is a re-posting of an article written by Hossein Hafezian, an esteemed academic in Iran and expert on the Middle East. The article is a brief overview of the implications of the election of Hassan Rouhani and the political atmosphere of modern Iran. The original article can be found here.

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Although Hassan Rouhani’s victory in the first round of the Iranian presidential elections appeared to be surprising to many observers — particularly those outside Iran — the fact is that in the past 16 years since 1997, the reformist and moderate elements have won every national election in which they have been given a fair chance. This election was no exception. Rouhani became the front-runner the day the reformist candidate, Mohammad Reza Aref, exited the contest to support Rouhani’s campaign. After that, it became a matter of whether Rouhani would win the election in the first or in the runoff round. For this favor to Rouhani and the entire reformist-centrist camp, Aref might be appointed first vice president, a position he held previously, under the second government of Mohammad Khatami.

What can Rouhani do?

Those who assert that the president cannot make a difference in Iranian domestic politics or foreign policy most likely did not live in Iran during the Khatami and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad presidencies. Thus, they have no true basis for comparing these periods. Even ordinary Iranians can tell how politics, economy and culture were totally different under these two men, who served under the same Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Certainly, a president is not in a position to change everything in Iran’s complicated political system, but he wields enough leverage to put his seal on Iranian politics and the economy, as presidents of the past couple of decades have done.

Rouhani, backed by the popular legitimacy he garnered with his undisputed victory, can now launch plans to return Iran to the path of economic development, political liberalization and rapprochement with the outside world after being derailed for eight years. The majority of the political elite has reached the conclusion that the country has been poorly run, particularly during the past four years, and has suffered from unnecessary tensions with the international community. Removing these tensions with Western powers and regional players is the key to addressing the economic hardship felt by all Iranians in their daily lives, notably during the last few years of international sanctions.

The consensus among the power centers in Iran was best illustrated by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ statement in which it promised Rouhani that it would fully cooperate with him. At the same time, Majlis speaker Ali Larijani visited Rouhani’s office to congratulate him and to promise his full cooperation in selecting his cabinet. These gestures serve to indicate that Rouhani will not be on a collision course with the other power brokers in Iran. All the circles of power apparently want to rid the country of its foreign policy troubles and craft a resolution to the nuclear standoff. Rouhani is likely to find a mutually acceptable solution to the nuclear issue in a few months, leading to the lifting of sanctions one by one.

In the Shining Sun of the Holy Prophet

On this blessed eid of Mab'ath (the day that Muhammad became appointed as the Holy Prophet of Allah), I'd like to share a wonderful poem by Saadi describing the absolute beauty and dignity of this mercy to the worlds, our master and leader, Rasullulah Muhammad. I will roughly translate the last two lines in his honor.

Until sleep, my eyes saw the beauty of Muhammad / [Alas] they will not sleep from the thought of Muhammad

Saadi, if you [want to] enact love and youth / The love of Muhammad and his family is enough.

ماه فروماند از جمال محمد

سرو نباشد به اعتدال محمد

قدر فلک را کمال و منزلتی نیست

در نظر قدر با کمال محمد

وعدهٔ دیدار هر کسی به قیامت

لیلهٔ اسری شب وصال محمد

آدم و نوح و خلیل و موسی و عیسی

آمده مجموع در ظلال محمد

عرصهٔ گیتی مجال همت او نیست

روز قیامت نگر مجال محمد

وآنهمه پیرایه بسته جنت فردوس

بو که قبولش کند بلال محمد

همچو زمین خواهد آسمان که بیفتد

تا بدهد بوسه بر نعال محمد

شمس و قمر در زمین حشر نتباد

نور نتابد مگر جمال محمد

شاید اگر آفتاب و ماه نتابند

پیش دو ابروی چون هلال محمد

چشم مرا تا به خواب دید جمالش

خواب نمی‌گیرد از خیال محمد

سعدی اگر عاشقی کنی و جوانی

عشق محمد بس است و آل محمد

VICE: Congressman Jim McDermott on Depleted Uranium Usage in US Military

When Kingship came down from Heaven: Ethics and the political

A very thought provoking lecture by the brilliant Dr. Sayyid. He is one of my favorite public intellectuals and has shaped my thought in many ways, especially through his book, A Fundamental Fear.

Sayyid discusses the relationship between ethics, morality, and power. He makes some fascinating arguments which I will try to briefly summarize below. Although I recommend listening to the entire lecture because it is really beneficial.

First, rationality and power are intimately intertwined in society. In short, every decision can be rationalized, but it is those in power who have the authority and legitimacy to first act, and second define their actions as rational. They are not always successful in this endeavor, mind you, but this is prevalent in the mundane acts of life -- it is only in extraordinary moments that this tends to get successfully challenged.

The second, and last point I wish to mention from the lecture is: the life we live is in the difference between what we should be and what we are. This is where ethics and morality comes in. Morality, it seems from the lecture, is how we should act, while ethics is the process of rectifying reality with normative states.

This is why kingship and ethics have always been intertwined historically speaking. It was and is recognized that our actions fall short of our ideals. Kings and rulers should be the representatives of God on earth, since God is the ultimate justice and truth.

This difference that Dr. Sayyid mentions, though, is what gives our life meaning. The constant striving to make our lives better is one of the things which differentiate us from beings which just respond to stimuli and go about life.

Re-posting: Tehran Tanking

Very insightful analysis on this relevant issue!

Tehran Tanking - By Marc Lynch | Foreign Policy

Iran is now viewed unfavorably in a majority of Arab countries, according to a major new survey conducted by James Zogby of 20 Arab and Muslim-majority countries. Iran's appeal to mainstream Arab public opinion has virtually collapsed from its 2006 peak, he found, in part because of its violent suppression of protests following the 2009 presidential election. "Syria is the nail in the coffin of Iran's favorable rating in the region," Zogby concluded.

But concealed within a positive narrative of collapsing Iranian soft power is powerful evidence of the alarming spread, intensification, and consolidation of an extremely dangerous sectarianism. That sectarianism, spurred by the repression in Bahrain and the catastrophe in Syria and fueled by Gulf media, is likely more crucial to the future of the Middle East than the ups and downs in Iranian -- or American -- favorable ratings.

It's nothing new to say that sectarianism has spiked over the last two years, after being largely absent in the early heady days of the Arab uprisings. Zogby's wide-ranging survey offers some fascinating new evidence, however. Public opinion survey research in the Arab worldalways needs to be treated with caution -- sampling is difficult in countries experiencing internal conflict or without accurate census data, while pervasive secret police make honesty a dubious proposition -- but it has become far more routinized and professionalized over the last decade. Some of the numbers in this Zogby poll seem a bit questionable: the 84 percent of Lebanese reporting a favorable view of Iran seems difficult to credit, while the results in Libya (80 percent favorable) and Yemen (84 percent favorable) may be shaped by the difficult of doing survey research in near-failed state conditions. But the broader portrait of Arab rejection of Iran and growing sectarianism is consistent with trends in the media, developments on the ground, and the symbolism of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad getting socked with a shoe in Cairo.

The major message in the presentation and reporting of the survey has been the narrative of Iranian decline, articulated bluntly by the title of the Wilson Center event where it was launched:The Rise and Fall of Iran in Arab and Muslim Eyes. The results of the survey do indeed support that narrative: Only two Arab countries now see Iran as a good model (Lebanon and Iraq), Iran is viewed unfavorably in 11 out of 17 Arab countries, and large majorities of Arab publics sided with the opposition Green Movement over the Iranian government and disapprove of Iran's role in Syria, Iraq, and the Gulf. These findings should put an end to the conceit that Iran is on the march or that Arabs have the slightest interest in aligning with Tehran with or without a nuclear bomb.

This should not be taken as a green light for military action against Tehran, though. While support for a military strike with international legitimacy has grown significantly since 2006 in the polling, there isn't a majority in favor in any Arab country. A 34-point increase in support for a military strike among Jordanians or a 24-point increase among Egyptians is significant as a trend. But approval of military action doesn't crack 40 percent in any surveyed country, which is hardly an overwhelming mandate. Indeed, an American or Israeli military strike is probably the only thing that could rescue Iran's regional image at this point -- particularly if the regime is able to emerge with a Hezbollah-like narrative of success through survival.

Iran's favorability will ebb and flow with political events. But the spreading and entrenched sectarianism revealed in the survey will have far more enduring and profoundly negative implications for the region. And the magnitude of the sectarian divide in the poll's findings is certainly eye-opening. In Saudi Arabia, 92 percent of Shia reported a favorable view of Iran compared with 0 percent of Sunnis; in Bahrain, 76 percent approved of Iran compared with 4 percent of Sunnis. The same phenomenon appeared in almost every country with a significant Shia population: 82 percent of Shia and 15 percent of Sunni in Iraq, 63 percent to 32 percent in Kuwait, 67 percent to 21 percent in the United Arab Emirates. The same trend could be seen across almost every question asked: Very few Sunnis anywhere, for instance, considered Iran a positive model for development, but 79 percent of Kuwaiti Shia did, along with 72 percent of Bahraini Shia and 89 percent of Iraq Shia.

Syria, which Zogby sees as the nail in the coffin for Iran, demonstrates the importance of this divide. Overall, few Arab populations thought Iran was playing a positive role in Syria: Thirteen percent of Jordanians, 17 percent of Palestinians and Moroccans, 12 percent of Egyptians, 9 percent of Saudis, 39 percent of Bahrainis. Only Lebanon (72 percent -- again, difficult to believe) and Iraq (54 percent) reported favorable views of Iran's role. But again, the sectarian breakdown shows that these views are increasingly shaped by identity: 57 percent of Saudi Shia thought Iran was playing a positive role in the Syria conflict (as opposed to 0 percent of Sunnis), as did 57 percent of Kuwaiti Shia, 73 percent of Bahraini Shia, 76 percent of Iraqi Shia, and 87 percent of Shia in the UAE. What initially looks like a unified Arab public stance toward Syria, and toward Iran more generally, turns into one of stark and intense polarization.

As an aside, the responses on the Iranian government's repression of the Green Movement in 2009 were fascinating. With three years' perspective, almost all Arab publics now sided with the Iranian democracy movement: 70 percent in Kuwait, 73 percent in Qatar, 65 percent in Egypt, 62 percent in Tunisia, 62 percent of Saudis. But the Shia divided in interesting ways: 87 percent of Kuwaiti Shia and 62 percent of Saudi Shia supported the Green Movement, but 69 percent of Bahraini Shia and 73 percent of Iraqi Shia sided with the Iranian government.

Arabs are worried about this growing sectarian divide. At least two thirds of respondents said they were concerned about the spread of sectarianism in almost every country surveyed. In many countries the concern was far wider: 100 percent of Lebanese, 97 percent of Iraqis, 87 percent of Jordanians, 89 percent of Palestinians, 85 percent of Yemenis, 82 percent of Saudis, 91 percent of Libyans, 83 percent of Egyptians, 75 percent of Kuwaitis, 74 percent of Bahrainis, 78 percent of Qataris. For many, this alarm over of sectarianism likely reflects a perception of rising Shia power in the region, but the evolving identity politics penetrate far more deeply into local politics as well as regional affairs.

Iran is not the principal driver of this sectarianism, however. Its rising power in the middle of the decade perhaps sparked Sunni fears, but its own rhetoric tends to focus on a generic "resistance" identity and on an "Islamic Awakening" rather than on Shiism's particulars. Its power grew with the American-led overthrow of its major strategic rivals in Afghanistan and Iraq. The peak of influence in the region probably came in 2006, when Hezbollah flags festooned the streets of (very Sunni) Cairo following its perceived military victory over Israel. From Tehran's perspective, even where it enjoys support from Shia communities, the less that Shiism is discussed and the more that Arabs focus on "resistance," the better. An Israeli or American attack on Iran or an Israeli war with Hezbollah or Hamas tends to highlight that narrative and thus helps Iran's image. Less often remarked is how that "resistance" narrative might unfold over the next few years following the fall of the Assad regime, where Iran might seek new support by sponsoring resistance to a Western and Gulf Arab-backed new regime in Damascus.

2010 Clandestine Expansion

An older NYT article on "systematic" expansion of covert operations in the Middle East

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WASHINGTON — The top American commander in the Middle East has ordered a broad expansion of clandestine military activity in an effort to disrupt militant groups or counter threats in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and other countries in the region, according to defense officials and military documents.

The secret directive, signed in September by Gen. David H. Petraeus, authorizes the sending of American Special Operations troops to both friendly and hostile nations in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa to gather intelligence and build ties with local forces. Officials said the order also permits reconnaissance that could pave the way for possible military strikes in Iran if tensions over its nuclear ambitions escalate.

While the Bush administration had approved some clandestine military activities far from designated war zones, the new order is intended to make such efforts more systematic and long term, officials said. Its goals are to build networks that could “penetrate, disrupt, defeat or destroy” Al Qaeda and other militant groups, as well as to “prepare the environment” for future attacks by American or local military forces, the document said. The order, however, does not appear to authorize offensive strikes in any specific countries.

In broadening its secret activities, the United States military has also sought in recent years to break its dependence on the Central Intelligence Agency and other spy agencies for information in countries without a significant American troop presence.

General Petraeus’s order is meant for small teams of American troops to fill intelligence gaps about terror organizations and other threats in the Middle East and beyond, especially emerging groups plotting attacks against the United States.

But some Pentagon officials worry that the expanded role carries risks. The authorized activities could strain relationships with friendly governments like Saudi Arabia or Yemen — which might allow the operations but be loath to acknowledge their cooperation — or incite the anger of hostile nations like Iran and Syria. Many in the military are also concerned that as American troops assume roles far from traditional combat, they would be at risk of being treated as spies if captured and denied the Geneva Conventionprotections afforded military detainees.

The precise operations that the directive authorizes are unclear, and what the military has done to follow through on the order is uncertain. The document, a copy of which was viewed by The New York Times, provides few details about continuing missions or intelligence-gathering operations.

Several government officials who described the impetus for the order would speak only on condition of anonymity because the document is classified. Spokesmen for the White House and the Pentagon declined to comment for this article. The Times, responding to concerns about troop safety raised by an official at United States Central Command, the military headquarters run by General Petraeus, withheld some details about how troops could be deployed in certain countries.

The seven-page directive appears to authorize specific operations in Iran, most likely to gather intelligence about the country’s nuclear program or identify dissident groups that might be useful for a future military offensive. The Obama administration insists that for the moment, it is committed to penalizing Iran for its nuclear activities only with diplomatic and economic sanctions. Nevertheless, the Pentagon has to draw up detailed war plans to be prepared in advance, in the event that President Obama ever authorizes a strike.

“The Defense Department can’t be caught flat-footed,” said one Pentagon official with knowledge of General Petraeus’s order.

The directive, the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Execute Order, signed Sept. 30, may also have helped lay a foundation for the surge of American military activity in Yemen that began three months later.

"Going to Tehran" Review

A very in depth and well written review by Gareth Porter of the Leverett's new book, Going to Tehran. This book looks to be quite important in the field Iranian international relations studies. Perhaps I will soon have the time and effort to translate this into Persian!

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“Going to Tehran” arguably represents the most important work on the subject of U.S.-Iran relations to be published thus far.

Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett tackle not only U.S. policy toward Iran but the broader context of Middle East policy with a systematic analytical perspective informed by personal experience, as well as very extensive documentation.

More importantly, however, their exposé required a degree of courage that may be unparalleled in the writing of former U.S. national security officials about issues on which they worked. They have chosen not just to criticise U.S. policy toward Iran but to analyse that policy as a problem of U.S. hegemony.

Their national security state credentials are impeccable. They both served at different times as senior coordinators dealing with Iran on the National Security Council Staff, and Hillary Mann Leverett was one of the few U.S. officials who have been authorised to negotiate with Iranian officials.

Both wrote memoranda in 2003 urging the George W. Bush administration to take the Iranian “roadmap” proposal for bilateral negotiations seriously but found policymakers either uninterested or powerless to influence the decision. Hillary Mann Leverett even has a connection with the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), having interned with that lobby group as a youth.

After leaving the U.S. government in disagreement with U.S. policy toward Iran, the Leveretts did not follow the normal pattern of settling into the jobs where they would support the broad outlines of the U.S. role in world politics in return for comfortable incomes and continued access to power.

Instead, they have chosen to take a firm stand in opposition to U.S. policy toward Iran, criticising the policy of the Barack Obama administration as far more aggressive than is generally recognised. They went even farther, however, contesting the consensus view in Washington among policy wonks, news media and Iran human rights activists that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election in June 2009 was fraudulent.

The Leveretts’ uncompromising posture toward the policymaking system and those outside the government who support U.S. policy has made them extremely unpopular in Washington foreign policy elite circles. After talking to some of their antagonists, The New Republic even passed on the rumor that the Leveretts had become shills for oil companies and others who wanted to do business with Iran.

The problem for the establishment, however, is that they turned out to be immune to the blandishments that normally keep former officials either safely supportive or quiet on national security issues that call for heated debate.

In “Going to Tehran”, the Leveretts elaborate on the contrarian analysis they have been making on their blog (formerly “The Race for Iran” and now “Going to Tehran”) They take to task those supporting U.S. systematic pressures on Iran for substituting wishful thinking that most Iranians long for secular democracy, and offer a hard analysis of the history of the Iranian revolution.

In an analysis of the roots of the legitimacy of the Islamic regime, they point to evidence that the single most important factor that swept the Khomeini movement into power in 1979 was “the Shah’s indifference to the religious sensibilities of Iranians”. That point, which conflicts with just about everything that has appeared in the mass media on Iran for decades, certainly has far-reaching analytical significance.

The Leveretts’ 56-page review of the evidence regarding the legitimacy of the 2009 election emphasises polls done by U.S.-based Terror Free Tomorrow and World Public Opinon and Canadian-based Globe Scan and 10 surveys by the University of Tehran. All of the polls were consistent with one another and with official election data on both a wide margin of victory by Ahmadinejad and turnout rates.

Sa'adi again

I read this very well written (if at times effusive) description of Wheeler Thackston's translation of Saadi's Golestan. I have not read this translation (in fact I just discovered it!) but Thackston is a literary giant and I am sure he does it justice. I'm excited since this has the Persian and English side by side with notes and vocabulary which will make the notoriously difficult syntax of Saadi much easier to comprehend. Thackston's Introduction to Persian is one of the best out there and has a similarly wonderful index of Persian works with very informative notes. I look forward to providing more detailed notes of this translation if I can get my hands on a copy soon. Here's the description of Thackston's Golestan translation:

Is the Gulistan the most influential book in the Iranian world? In terms of prose, it is the model, which all writers of Persian seek to emulate. In terms of moral, philosophical or practical wisdom, it is endlessly quoted to either illustrate or prove a point. Sir John Malcolm even relates being told that it is the basis of the law of the Persians. It also traveled abroad. Voltaire, Goethe, Arnold, Longfellow, Emerson, Thoreau, Melville, and Franklin discovered, read, and took inspiration from the work. Moreover, travelers to Iran have often point out that to understand the mind of the inhabitants, one should read the Gulistan. 

Written some seven and a half centuries ago by Sa di of Shiraz the Gulistan or Rose Garden is a collection of moral stories divided into eight themes: The Conduct of Kings, The Character of Dervishes, The Superiority of Contentment, The Benefits of Silence, Love and Youth, Feebleness and Old Age, The Effects of Education, and The Art of Conversation. In each section stories are told from which the reader learns how to behave in a given situation. Sa di can be moral. Honesty gives God pleasure. I haven t seen anyone get lost on the right road. He may be practical. If you can t stand the sting, don t put your finger into a scorpion s hole. He is philosophical in these lines which are engraved at the entrance of the United Nations: The members of the human race are limbs one to another, for at creation they were of one essence. When one limb is pained by fate, the others cannot rest.

The Gulistan is considered the essence of elegant but simple Persian prose. For 600 years, it was the first book placed in the learner s hand. In Persian-speaking countries today, quotations from the Gulistan appear in every conceivable type of literature and is the source of numerous everyday proverbial statements, much as Shakespeare is in English. 

This is the first complete English translation of the Gulistan in more than a century. Wheeler M. Thackston, Professor of Persian at Harvard University, has faithfully translated Sa di into clear contemporary English. To help the student, the original Persian is presented facing the English translation. A 3,600 word Persian-English and Arabic-English glossary is included to aide with the more difficult meanings. 

The Gulistan is imbued with a practical wisdom of life. Sa di recognizes people for what they are. Every personality type that exists is found in the Rose Garden, the good, the bad, the weak, the strong, the pious, the impious, honest folk, and the most conniving of cheats. Hypocrites abound, foolish kings appear with their wily ministers, wise rulers vie with their malevolent courtiers, boastful young warriors turn tail and run [emphasis added]. The beauty of Sa di s wisdom is that it is timeless. What is expressed is in a setting so close and familiar to the modern experience that it is as relevant today as it was six hundred years ago.

Knowing that you don't know

I'm currently reading about a fascinating movement in the 14th century called the "Sarbedars" who operated in Khorasan (somewhat near modern day Mashhad). They're a fascinating bunch and during their rule a prominent poet by the name of Ibn Yamin emerges, who composes these funny lines (variations of this still abound in modern Persian):

One who knows and knows that he knows... His horse of wisdom will reach the skies.
One who knows, but doesn't know that he knows... He is fast asleep, so you should wake him up!
One who doesn't know, but knows that he doesn't know... His limping mule will eventually get him home.
One who doesn't know and doesn't know that he doesn't know... He will be eternally lost in his hopeless oblivion!

آن کس که بداند و بداند که بداند

اسب خرد از گنبد گردون بجهاند

آن کس که بداند و نداند که بداند

آگاه نمایید که بس خفته نماند

آن کس که نداند و بداند که نداند

لنگان خرک خویش به منزل برساند

آن کس که نداند و نداند که نداند

در جهل مرکب ابدالدهر بماند

Islamic Political Alternative

Excerpt from Richard Bulliet's excellent book, Islam: the view from the edge, written in 1994:

"I maintain that, whether or not they ultimately live by the ideals they espouse, today's Islamic activists have inherited from their historical tradition a claim to authority quite different from that of the familiar Middle Eastern monarchs and dictators, a claim that holds substantial promise of restructuring the political, cultural, and moral atmosphere of the Middle East.

The authority I see them wielding is the ability to answer the questions raised by believers in a fashion that convinces the believers of their correctness.. Nationalistic answers that once seemed heady and progressive, buttressed by a purported superiority of cultural and intellectual values originally imported from the West, now fall flat before the whispered--or shouted--suspicion that they are actually symptoms of the malignancy of cultural Imperialism...

I believe the future of the Muslim world lies with the Islamic political alternative."

Crusades in Muslim Lands

I ran across this really interesting piece of prose regarding the crusades. I thought would be nice to share with readers, it is very moving and beautiful. The excerpt is from the chronicler Ibn al-Athir.

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http://www.wwnorton.com/college/english/nael/middleages/topic_3/alathir.htm

It was the discord between the Muslim princes * * * that enabled the Franks to overrun the country. Abu l-Musaffar al Abiwardi >> note 3 composed several poems on this subject, in one of which he says:

We have mingled blood with flowing tears, and there is no room
left for pity.

To shed tears is a man's worst weapon when the swords stir
up the embers of war.
Sons of Islam, behind you are battles in which heads rolled
at your feet.
Dare you slumber in the blessed shade of safety, where life is
soft as an orchard flower?
How can the eye sleep between the lids at a time of disasters
that would waken any sleeper?
While your Syrian brothers can only sleep on the backs of their
chargers or in vultures' bellies!
Must the foreigners feed on our ignominy, while you trail behind
the train of a pleasant life, like men whose world is at peace?
When blood has been spilt, when sweet girls must for shame hide
their lovely faces in their hands!
When the white swords' points are red with blood, and the iron
of the brown lances is stained with gore!
At the sound of sword hammering on lance young children's hair
turns white.
This is war, and the infidel's sword is naked in his hand, ready
to be sheathed in men's necks and skulls.
This is war, and he who lies in the tomb at Medina >> note 4 seems
to raise his voice and cry: "O sons of Hashim!
I see my people slow to raise the lance against the enemy:
I see the Faith resting on feeble pillars.
For fear of death the Muslims are evading the fire of battle,
refusing to believe that death will surely strike them."
Must the Arab champions then suffer with resignation,
while the gallant Persians shut their eyes to their dishonour?

Traffic accidents in Iran

Iran has extremely bad driving practices, as those who have visited the country can attest. Below is some very informative information from a UN organization (UNICEF) which paired up with other organizations in Iran to help spread awareness.

Key points:  Each year, road traffic crashes kill nearly 28,000 people in Iran, and injure or disable 300,000 more.

What can be done to help bring these numbers down? I must admit I'm not an expert, but a list of solutions has been listed by UNICEF. In any case, becoming informed is the first step to take for sure. I know Iranians are good at being engineers, so any comments about what to do practically would be more than appreciated! 


I've re-posted the UNICEF article below, hopefully once we realize the gravity of the situation we can go about helping to combat this problem.

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Traffic accidents on Iran’s roads cause thousands of deaths and injuries every year, and cost the country’s economy billions of dollars. UNICEF, together with Iran’s Ministry of Health, State Welfare Organisation, police forces, and the Municipality of Tehran, has begun an awareness-raising campaign to shed more light on these facts and to contribute to reducing the mortality and injury rates caused by road accidents. Some of the key statistics of which any traffic participant in Iran should be aware are:

Ø The rate of road accidents in Iran is twenty times more than the world’s average.

Ø Globally, road traffics accidents kill 1.2 million people every year and leave 20-50 million people injured and disabled.

Ø In Iran, among all unintentional fatal injuries inflicted on children under five, traffic-related fatalities are the leading cause of death.

Ø Each year, road traffic crashes kill nearly 28,000 people in Iran, and injure or disable 300,000 more.

Ø Every 19 minutes one person dies on Iran’s roads, and every two minutes people will hear that one of their family members has survived a crash but with serious injury and perhaps lifelong disability.

Ø Traffic fatalities cost Iran’s economy six billion US dollar every year, which amounts to more than five per cent of the country’s Gross National Product.

Ø Some 25 per cent of all road fatalities in Iran are those involving motorcycles; over 60 per cent of those occur because the drivers did not wear a helmet and incurred head traumas.

Ø 90% of road traffic deaths in the world occur in low-income and middle-income countries.

Ø By the year 2020, road crashes will rank ahead of cancer and behind only heart disease and depression in terms of life-years lost.

Ø Globally, Road traffic injuries are the second leading cause of death for young people aged 5–25 years.

Ø Road traffic crashes are predictable and can be prevented. Many countries have achieved sharp reductions in the number of crashes and the frequency and severity of traffic-related injuries by addressing key issues. Interventions that have been proven to be effective include those that deal with:

Ø Speeding: Speed is a main factor contributing to road traffic injuries in most countries. Young men in particular are likely to drive at excessive or inappropriate speeds. Reducing the average traffic speed by 1 km/h has been shown to lead to a 4%–5% decrease in fatal crashes.

Ø Seat-belts: Seat-belts have saved more lives than any other road safety intervention in the event of a crash. Young male drivers have been found to use seat-belts less frequently than other groups. Seat-belts can reduce the risk of all injuries by 40%–50%, and of fatal injuries by 40%–60%.

Ø Child restraints: Child restraints, such as infant and child seats and booster seats, have been shown to be highly effective at preventing fatalities among both infants and young children travelling in cars. Child restraints reduce the death rates in car crashes by 71% among infants and by 54% among young children.

Ø Helmets: Wearing a helmet is the single most effective way of reducing head injuries and fatalities resulting from motorcycle, moped and bicycle crashes. Young men are less likely to wear helmets while riding motorcycles. Motorcycle helmets have been shown to reduce the risk and severity of head injury by about 70%.

Ø Road design and infrastructure: Measures to improve road design and infrastructure include: separating different types of traffic; providing safer routes for pedestrians and cyclists; building pavements and recognizable crossing structures for pedestrians; and reducing traffic speeds by constructing speed bumps, rumble strips and roundabouts.

Ø Emergency services: Many road crash victims die before they reach a hospital because of inadequate emergency services, including medical, fire and police services. Improving the emergency services from the crash scene to the health facility and beyond will increase the chances of those involved in road traffic crashes surviving, and avoiding long-lasting disabilities and injuries.

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