International Law and the Iran Impasse [Re-post]

I'm re-posting a highly interesting and well argued essay written by Asli Bali, of UCLA law school, on the legal implications of the sanctions and nuclear program of Iran. Well worth a thorough read by anyone interested in this issue.

It mirrors a lot of very accurate sentiments argued by Mehdi Mohammadi of Kayhan in an article I translated a while back.

--------------------
On any given day, provided her paper of choice still features international coverage, the average American newspaper reader can expect to be treated to one or two articles on attempts to halt advances in Iran’s nuclear program. These articles might cover efforts to levy fresh sanctions against the Islamic Republic; they might relay news of discussions among Iran’s primary interlocutors on the nuclear question, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (the so-called P5+1), about diplomatic overtures. Or the stories might echo the mounting calls for airstrikes or other military action to delay and disrupt the progress of Iranian nuclear research. Until October, indeed, breathless reporting on the increasing likelihood of Israeli military strikes on Iran was daily fare. The brakes were placed on this speculation in time for the US presidential elections, but the brief respite has come to an end.

Israel, the United States and their principal Western partners all now seem agreed upon a spring 2013 make-or-break deadline by which Iran must accept a Western-backed deal or face an array of threatened military operations aiming to damage or destroy its nuclear facilities. In the meantime, a crippling international sanctions regime, reinforced by even more extensive bilateral sanctions imposed by the US and its allies in Europe and Asia, chips away at the Iranian economy. Sporadic acts of sabotage kill off the cadre of physicists and other nuclear scientists who contribute to Iran’s nuclear program.

Amidst these developments, the one question that is rarely asked is what exactly Iran has done to occasion all of this international concern and pressure, let alone the rumblings of imminent attack. In one sense, the answer to this question is obvious: Because international actors fear that Iran wants to build an atomic bomb, they perceive its nuclear program as an unacceptable threat to Iran’s neighbors, especially the Gulf Arab monarchies and Israel. Put differently, the specter of an Iranian bomb strengthens the Islamic Republic’s claim to be a regional hegemon and counterweight -- read, political challenge -- to the pro-American distribution of power in the Middle East.

Yet if these answers seem self-evident, they do not answer another critical question. The UN Security Council is supreme arbiter of international law, and its repeated interventions on the Iranian nuclear issue have created an ambient sense that what Iran is doing is illegal. In what sense are Iran’s nuclear activities unlawful? In other words, to what extent does the illegality of Iran’s nuclear program legitimate the regime of sanctions and punishment to which the country has been subjected? The answer to this second-order question is far less straightforward and points to the gray zone of international law where politics most directly shapes, and at times even trumps, the normative order.
NPT Law

The first document relevant to the Iranian nuclear impasse is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, to which Iran is a signatory. Article IV of the NPT specifies the rights of state parties to the treaty to engage in nuclear research geared toward peaceful uses, such as power generation or production of isotopes with medical utility. In 1975, Iran also signed a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), by which the UN nuclear watchdog is authorized to conduct regular inspections to verify that state parties are not engaged in pursuit of an explosive device.

From the time that it first revealed -- under pressure from prior revelations by an Iranian dissident group -- that it had resumed its nuclear program in 2002, Iran insisted that its activities were intended for the development of a civilian nuclear energy program. More specifically, Iran claimed that its centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program was designed to yield low-enriched uranium as fuel for nuclear power plants, as opposed to the high-enriched uranium that would be necessary to produce weapons-grade fuel. Further, the Iranians insisted, such an enrichment program was entirely consistent with their rights and obligations under Article IV of the NPT.

Confronting Moral Police on IRIB

I ran across a very interesting interview which took place on Iran's official Jaam-e Jam (IRIB) network with a young host grilling a official from the Islamic Republic police force tasked with upholding "moral security."

The clip is in Persian (unfortunately no subtitles), but it was a very interesting few minutes. We often think of all organs of the Iranian government as "sticking to the script" -- i.e. just praising all the policies and actions of the Islamic Republic. However, as the clip below demonstrates, there is a wide variety of opinions and outlooks, even within the government and its personel.

The young host is essentially telling the police commander that the method of Iranian police in enforcing moral behavior (telling people to wear better clothing, breaking up un-married couples, etc.) is way over the top. The style of confronting immoral behavior is wrong, says the host, not that immoral behavior should be allowed to go unchecked by the Iranian police. The host recounts personal stories of how he and others were treated like petty criminals instead of like regular citizens. If the role of the moral police is to guide people on the right path, then treating people roughly is not the right way to go about it.

I think he raises some good points.

Morsi Op-Ed Guardian

Below is an interesting op-ed which I think correctly approaches some of the issues confronting Egypt today. It's a bit weird to see a Western newspaper correctly identify the situation largely in favor of an "Islamist," but I suppose weirder things have happened.

-----------------

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/dec/07/egypt-tug-of-war-editorial

As the crisis in Egypt develops, it is becoming increasingly clear what it is not about. It is not about the proposed constitution, many of whose provisions opposition members put their signatures to, before changing their minds and walking out of the drafting committee. Negotiations on the contentious clauses have been offered and rejected. Nor is it about the date of the referendum, which the Egyptian justice minister, Ahmed Mekki, offered to postpone. Again, this was rejected. Nor even is it about the temporary but absolute powers that the Egyptian president,Mohamed Morsi, assumed for himself – which will lapse the moment the referendum is held whatever the result.

Urging the opposition to shun dialogue, Mohamed ElBaradei said that Morsi had lost his legitimacy. So the target of the opposition National Salvation Front is not the constitution, or the emergency decree, but Morsi himself. What follows is a power battle in which the aim is to unseat a democratically elected president, and to prevent a referendum and fresh parliamentary elections being held, both of which Islamists stand a good chance of winning. Morsi, for his part, is determined that both polls be held as soon as possible to reaffirm the popular mandate which he still thinks he has.

In weighing who occupies the moral high ground, let us start with what happened on Wednesday night. That is when the crisis, sparked by Morsi's decree when he was at the height of his domestic popularity over the role he played in stopping the Israeli assault on Gaza, turned violent. The Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice party sanctioned a violent assault on a peaceful encampment of opposition supporters outside the presidential palace. But lethal force came later, and Islamists were its principle victims. Five of the six people killed in Cairo were members of the Brotherhood and one came from the opposition. Two more Islamists were killed outside the capital. Brotherhood offices were attacked up and down the country, while no other party offices were touched. This does not fit the opposition's narrative to be the victims of Islamist violence. Both sides are victims of violence and the real perpetrators are their common enemy.

Morsi undoubtedly made grave mistakes. In pre-empting a decision by the constitutional court to derail his constitution, his decree was cast too wide. The final draft of the constitution has many faults, although none are set in stone. The opposition on the other hand has never accepted the results of freely held elections, parliamentary or presidential, and is doing everything to stop new ones being held.

Iranian Internal politics

The case of Sattar Beheshti is a very intriguing one. It achieved a widespread following due to the newspaper Iran bringing the story to prominence. Iran is run by  pro-Ahmadinejad supporters and it is speculated that they revealed this case after Sadeq Larijani refused Ahmadinejad to visit his jailed press adviser, Ali Akbar Javanfekr. 

The lesson to be taken here is that the politics within Iran and the dynamics which play out within the borders are much more significant than having outside "human rights" group push the Iranian government to reform. In this case, a totally domestic series of events led to one of the most open investigations and debates over rights abuse in the country. This was also the case with the notorious "chain murders" during Mohammad Khatami's presidency when domestic journalists uncovered the case which led to reforms of the Intelligence Ministry and greater transparency (although as we now see there is a long way to go!).

As Middle East Online reports:

Beheshti, 35, was found dead in his cell in a Tehran prison on November 3 after being arrested on October 30, according to chief prosecutor Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejeie.

His death also provoked outrage inside the regime, in a rare case of Iran accepting international criticism over a human rights complaint.

Judiciary officials have promised a full investigation into the case, leading to seven arrests so far, according to Iranian media.

 Alaeddine Boroujerdi, who heads parliament's national security and foreign affairs committee, took issue on Saturday with claims by pathologists that Beheshti had died from shock and fear, saying he had "very clearly" been beaten while in detention.

MEO does a fair job of reporting, however with the vast majority of other outside press, when politics plays out in Iran, it's always framed as "de-legitimizing" and a sign that the regime is cracking. This is probably the case because Western media treats Iran as if it was Saddam's Iraq where one class of people, dominated by minority Sunni Baathists, autocratically ruled the country as their personal kingdom with zero regard for any politics outside of single-party Baathist dominance through pure fear. These commentators who make such ill-intentioned remarks about Iran do not understand the nature of Iranian politics and society. 

The Islamic Republic was established as a result of a popular revolution and referendum which followed. The Iranian political scene was full of factions with differing beliefs from the very start and despite institutional make up at the top, the momentum has always been with the Iranian people to change the status-quo. Yet, for some reason for Western press, when politics plays out in Iran, it is always a sign that the regime is breaking up. This is far from the truth, in fact it shows that differences are actually being negotiated in a society. In this instance, it led to very promising results, with open parliamentary questioning.

There is a long way to go in reforming the parts of Iranian government and society which are against Islamic morality and practices, such as prisoner abuse and overbearing censorship. However, these reforms will only be genuine if they are a result of a dialogue and practice happening within the country, not dictated by haughty groups from the outside who believe they know what is best for every situation and every nation.

The Character of 'Ali ibn Abi Talib

If I strike the nose of a believer with this sword of mine so that he will become my enemy, it will not create hostility and if I pour the (riches of the) whole world on the head of a hypocrite so that he may like me, he will never like me; because this has been decreed and laid down by the tongue of the Prophet when he said: "O `Ali, the believer will never be your enemy and the hypocrite will never love you!" [3]

-- Morteza Motahhari
http://www.al-islam.org/polarization/

شب آخر - The final night

The below poem is an amateur attempt at writing Persian poetry which I wrote as I was walking back home from campus... as you can see Autumnal nights in Chicago have a very special feel to them. I originally wrote the poem in Persian but have translated in English below as well. I hope you enjoy.

متن زیرین یک سعی بسیار ساده ای بر نوشتن شعر فارسی است که چند هفته پیش وقتی از کامپوس  داشتم راه میرفتم به سمت خانه ام  نوشتم... همانطوری که میتوانید ملاحظه  کنید، شبهای شیکاگو در فصل پاییزی  یک حس خاصی دارند:  

در این شب آخر پردهای  کابوسی بر چشمانم بسته شدن
 نفس تلخ در شش های بسته فرو نمیرود
ای چشم های رنگین پریده، ای ششهای نفس پریده
ای ذهن نفهم، بیدار شو که دم پیشین نشود دم آخر

In this final night, the curtain of nightmares have closed on my eyes

Bitter breath does not enter my closed lungs

Oh eyes whose color has leapt out, oh lungs whose breath has escaped

Oh ignorant mind, wake up so that the next breath will not become the last 

Talking in Taxis in Cairo

I recently finished reading a very engaging book written by Egyptian author Khaled Alkhamissi, titled "Taxi." It's a quick read and written in narrative form as the author recounts his technically fictional yet surely inspired by true encounters with Cairo's taxi drivers.

Taxis are an interesting concept and expose riders to certain social realities especially in diverse and large cities such as Cairo.

I found one passage, in particular, to be worthy of transcribing and presenting to the readers of this blog.

Chapter 13, page 42:

"As we were driving along the Cairo University wall I let slip to the taxi driver how nostalgic I felt for my college days and confessed to him that the dreams for Egypt I dreamt within these walls even now shook me to the core, despite the passage of two decades since my graduation. I said that most of those who sold out had been handed the keys to the gates, while those who continued to dream had seen their towering hopes dashed to the ground by battering rams.

'And what did you study?' the driver asked.

'Economics and political science,' I said.

'So you studied politics, sir?'

'Yes.'

'That's great, an excellent opportunity, because for ages I've had a question I wanted to ask,' said the driver.

'What's the question? Maybe I can answer it.'

'What would happen if we said to America: "you have nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and if you don't get rid of all these weapons, we will sever relations with you and declare war on you, and we will have to use military force to protect Cuba, because it's a small country and we have to look after it?"

'Of course, we wouldn't be serious, but we would stake out a position in the world. And the world would have to stand with us as they stood with them when they said the same thing against Iraq, and as they are saying now against Iran. I'm not saying we would fight them. Of course you know what I mean. But we would say exactly the same thing as they are saying to the countries of the world. I mean, for example, we'd ask to monitor the American elections because we're not confident their election procedures are sound, we'd ask for there to be international monitoring of the ballot boxes, and anyway we'd be right to say that. Everyone in America and the whole world said the Bush elections were rigged and that his brother fixed the elections and made him win his state. And we'd say we have to defend democracy and we have to send Egyptian judges from here to make sure the democratic process is sound.

'You know if we did that, we'd make them understand what they are doing to people, and we'd vent some of the anger that's inside us, just like when some calamity strikes and there's nothing to be done so you let off steam to whoever and you find yourself calmer, but the disaster's still the same as it was.

'We could also sue America for supporting international terrorism and taking sides with countries that aren't democratic, and get evidence of that an, as you know, it's very easy to get evidence, especially in this matter. By making a move like that, you're on the side of democracy and against terrorism and you'll find a few countries taking your side against America.

'We could also call for economic sanctions against America if they don't comply, I mean take what Rice says every day to all the poor countries in the world and say the same thing to their faces.

'The most important thing is that we all do away with the word "Americans". We should say a White Irish Protestant from America, or a Black Muslim from America, or a Spaniard from America, or a White Catholic from America, or a Black Protestant from America, just like they say these days: "six Shia and two Sunnis from Iraq died". The sons of bitc&^s at our newspapers repeat the same thing, and of course you find them saying: "a Christian from Egypt" and "a Muslim from Egypt". Surely we have to demand as loud as we can the right to defend the rights of the blacks in America, and sue if some White Scot from America kills some Black African from America, of course we have to make a big scene not least because he's African like us, I mean, he's much more closely related to us than a White Italian with a mole on his cheek from America is to some Copt from Egypt. I mean, protecting the rights of the black minority there, that's our role, and we have to intervene in everything big and small.

'I know I'm talking too much and repeating myself. I'm waiting for you to respond but you just hold your tongue and don't reply.

'I'm thinking about what you're saying,' I answered.

'You see, I leave the radio on all day and every day what the Americans say gets up my nose. It's enough to drive a man out of his senses. It's very serious because soon people will explode. "We feed you, we put you on your potty, do this, don't do that." Soon we'll burst and that'll be the end of it. So I had this idea, that we should do to them just as they do to us. People who live in glass houses shouldn't throw stones. And those people live in houses of cracked glass.'

'OK so why don't you send that suggestion to--' I started.

'I'm just letting off steam, man, I mean shooting the breeze. They're ready to let the Americans do anything to us. The suggestion they might like is for the Americans to put a camera in every Egyptian house so they can monitor the population explosion!'